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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ~ 78A.-.J .. l 02(3 )(j ). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW1 
Issue 1: Whether the district court correctly held that Gables at Sterling 
Village Homeowners Association ("HOA" or "Association") lacks contractual privity to 
assert its breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim? 
Standard of Review: An appeal of a summary judgment decision is considered 
"under a de novo standard of review, granting no deference to the district court's 
analysis." L.C. Canyon Partners, L.L.C. v. Salt lake Countv, 2011 UT 63, fi 8. 266 P.3d 
797. "A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference; we review 
them for correctness." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467,470 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation: R. 1074-1401, 1682-1702, 4092-4097, 4169-4171, 10297-10303 
(1/10/2014 Hearing Tr.). 
Issue 2: Whether the district court correctly held that the HOA failed to 
establish a prima facie case of breach of the implied warranty? 
Standard of Review: An appeal of a summary judgment decision is considered 
"under a de novo standard of review, granting no deference to the district court's 
analysis." L.C. Canvon Partners, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2011 UT 63, i; 8, 266 P.3d 
797. "A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference; we review 
them for correctness." Grnvson Roper Ltd. v. Finlin:::;on, 782 P.2d 467. 470 (t:uh l \>Si.)). 
1 Appellant's issues on appeal numbers three and four do not apply to this Appellee and 
therefore are not addressed in this brief. (HOA Br. at 2, 21-22, 35-51.) 
2 
Preservation: R. 1074-1401, 1682-1702, 4092-4097, 4169-4171, 10297-10303 
(1/10/2014 Hearing Tr.). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Gables at Sterling Village ("Gables") is a residential development located in 
South Jordan, Utah. Gables consists of 78 residential units in 15 buildings, which are 
surrounded by common areas. Gables was developed by Defendants/Third-Party 
Plaintiffs/ Appellees Castlewood-Sterling Village I, LLC ("Castlewood-Sterling"); Jeffrey 
A. Duke ("Duke"); Darren Mansell ("Mansell"); Dan Lybbert ("Lybbert"); Castlewood 
Development, LLC, which converted into Castlewood Development, Inc. ("Castlewood 
Development"); and Richard L. Harris ("Harris") ( collectively, "Developers"). Gables 
was constructed by Castlewood Builders, LLC ("Builders"), as general contractor. 
Builders hired several sub-contractors to assist in the construction work at Gables. 
On or about June 28, 2006, Developers established the HOA by recording the 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Gables at Sterling Village, A 
Planned Unit Development ("Declaration"). The Developers transferred control of the 
HOA to the Gables homeowners on January 1, 2008. The HOA claims it discovered 
defects in the construction of certain buildings at Gables shortly thereafter. The HOA 
hired an expert to investigate further and draft a report detailing the alleged defects. 
On February 2, 2010, the HOA filed suit against the Developers and Builders 
alleging, among other things, that the Developers and Builders breached the implied 
warranty of habitability by defectively constructing the buildings at the Gables. The 
Developers and Builders then sued various subcontractors, including R&JL, for breach of 
3 
contract alleging that if Developers and Builders were liable to the HOA under an 
implied warranty claim then the subcontractors were liable to Developers and Builders 
for those damages. At the close of fact discovery, one of the sub-contractors, B.A. 
Critchfield Construction, LLC ("Critchfield"), filed a motion for summary judgment 
against the HOA. In its motion for summary judgment, Critchfield argued that the HOA 
lacked contractual privity to sue either the Builders or the Developers, and, even if the 
HOA did have privity, the HOA failed to establish a prima facie case of breach of the 
implied warranty. R&JL filed a joinder to Critchfield' s motion for summary judgment. 
On March 4, 2014, the district court granted Critchfield' s motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the HOA' s breach of the implied warranty claim. 2 The district 
court concluded that contractual privity is necessary for a breach of the implied warranty 
claim and the HOA did not have contractual privity with the Developers or Builders. The 
district court further held that the HOA failed to satisfy the elements for a breach of the 
implied warranty claim as this Court detailed in Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing 
Homeowners Association v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing. LC, 2009 UT 65, 221 P.3d 
234 (hereinafter ''Davencourf'). The HOA now appeals the district court's ruling. 
2 Third-Party Defendants Critchfield and Beus Roofing, Inc. also moved for summary 
judgment against Third-Party Plaintiffs on their Third-Party Complaint. R&JL also joined 
in those motions. The district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the third-
party claims against the Third-Party Defendants. That order granting summary judgment 
in favor of R&JL and the other Third-Party Defendants on the third-party claims has not 
been appealed. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The HOA filed its Complaint with the district court on February 2, 2010. (R. 1-
36.) On March 12, 2010, the HOA filed its First Amended Complaint. (R. 40-68.) In its 
Third Cause of Action, the HOA alleges that the Developers and Builders breached the 
implied warranties of construction in a workmanlike manner and habitability. (R. 54-57.) 
The HOA' s claim arises from alleged defects in the construction of the buildings at 
Gables. On March 18, 2011, Developers and Builders filed their Third-Party Complaint 
and Jury Demand ("Third-Party Complaint"). (R. 147-159.) In the Third-Party 
Complaint, Developers and Builders allege that "[i]n the event it is found that any of the 
workmanship or materials provided by the [Developers and Builders] are defective," it is 
because R&JL and the other subcontractors breached their contractual obligations to 
Builders. (R. 153-154.) 
A. Development of the Gables. 
Castlewood-Sterling owned and developed the real property at the Gables. (R. 
2178 at ,I 2.) Castlewood Development is the manager of Castlewood-Sterling. (R. 2178 
at ,r 3.) Builders operated as a separate and independent general contract entity and 
constructed the improvement at Gables, including the building common areas and all lot 
infrastructure improvements. (R. 2178 at 'll'TT 1, 5.) The Developers created the HOA by 
recording the Declaration with the Salt Lake County Recorder on June 28, 2006. (R. 2182 
at 'lf 23.) Pursuant to the Declaration, the HOA is responsible for the maintenance, repair, 
and replacement of the exterior surfaces and roofs of the units at Gables. (R. 43 at CU 15; 
R. 2206.) 
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B. The HOA Observes Construction Defects. 
After homeowners began moving into the units, they reported defects in the 
construction, including concrete cracking and potential water intrusion. (R. 45 at ,r 23.) 
The HOA retained experts to inspect the scope of the reported concrete cracking and 
water intrusion. (R. 45 at ,r 24.) The HOA' s experts allegedly found cracking in the 
stucco on the exterior of the buildings, cracking in concrete, and water intrusion into the 
foundations, floors, porches, stucco, sidewalls, exterior walls, doors, windows, and roofs. 
(R. 45 at ,r 25.) The HOA alleges that it made repeated requests that Developers and 
Builders repair the alleged defects, but Developers and Builders did not repair and correct 
the alleged defects. (R. 47 at ,r 28.) 
C. The HOA Files Suit against the Developers and Builders. 
The HOA initiated this lawsuit against the Developers and Builders alleging that 
Developers and Builders breached the implied warranty to a new residence. (R. 2178 at ,r 
6.) The HOA argues that the Declaration is a contract between Developers and the HOA 
and the Declaration includes an implied warranty of construction in a workmanlike 
manner and the warranty of habitability. (R. 2178 at ,r 7.) The HOA further argues that 
Developers breached the Declaration, and the implied warranties of workmanlike 
construction and habitability, by failing to hire a general contractor that would adequately 
inspect and supervise construction work in accordance with the project plans and that 
would make sure subcontractors complied with accepted industry standards applicable to 
their area of work. (R. 2179 at ,r 8.) The HOA admits that it does not have privity of 
contract with Builders. (R. 2179 at iJ 9; R. 2181 at iJ 15.) 
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Developers and Builders filed the Third-Party Complaint against the 
subcontractors on March 18, 2011. (R. 147-159.) Developers and Builders allege that the 
named third-party defendants provided material or services for the construction of 
Gables. (R. 149 at ,I 8; R. 2180-2181.) Developers and Builders allege that R&JL 
performed work with regard to the Gables' soffit and fascia. (R. 151 at ~ 22.) Developers 
and Builders claim they entered into a subcontract with R&JL and that R&JL breached 
that contract. (R. 153 at ,I 33.) However, R&JL only entered into one contract related to 
Gables, and that contract was executed by and between R&JL and Builders. (R. 1682-
1702.) Developers did not enter into a contract with R&JL, and thus there is no privity of 
contract between Developers and R&JL. (R. 1686-1702.) 
D. Critchfield Moves for Summary Judgment and R&JL Joins in 
the Motion. 
On September 6, 2013, Critchfield filed a motion for summary judgment seeking 
dismissal of the HOA' s breach of implied warranty claim against Developers and 
Builders. (R. 1074-1076.) Specifically, Critchfield claimed the HOA lacked standing to 
bring its breach of implied warranty claim because the HOA is not, and never has been, 
an owner of any of the units at Gables, and, therefore, lacks contractual privity with either 
Developers or Builders. (R. 1083-1086.) Critchfield further argued that the HOA failed to 
satisfy the necessary elements for a breach of the implied warranty claim. (R. 1087-
1090.) In support of its arguments, Critchfield relied on this Court's decision m 
Davencourt. (R. 1084-1090.) On September 20, 2013, R&JL filed its Joinder m 
Critchfield' s motion for summary judgment. (R. 1682-1702.) 
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In opposition, the HOA argued that the Declaration grants the HOA broad 
authority to sue the Developers and Builders. (R. 2184-2186.) Moreover, the HOA 
argued that it satisfied the elements to assert an implied warranty claim. (R. 2187-2192.) 
The HOA attached a self-serving declaration from its rebuttal expert to its opposition in 
an attempt to cure the fatal deficiencies in its case. (R. 2183 ,r 27; R. 3134-3138.) 
Critchfield filed its reply memorandum on November 12, 2013. (R. 3462-3570.) 
Over two months after it submitted its opposition and briefing was complete, the 
HOA filed a motion for leave to supplement its opposition. (R. 3948-3950.) In its 
proposed supplement, the HOA argued that it also had privity with the Developers as an 
intended third-party beneficiary to the real estate purchase contracts ("REPCs") and 
warranty deeds between the original homeowners and the Developers. (R. 3952-3955.) 
Critchfield objected to the HOA's motion for leave because the proposed supplemental 
argument was untimely, the arguments were available to the HOA at the time it filed its 
original opposition, and Utah Courts have previously rejected the supplemental 
arguments. (R. 3977-3983.) 
E. The District Court Grants Critchfield's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and R&JL's Joinder and Dismisses the HOA's breach 
of Implied Warranty Claim. 
On March 4, 2014, the district court issued its Ruling and Order on Third-Party 
Defendant B.A. Critchfield Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Plainttff HOA (the "March 4 Ruling"), granting Critchfield's motion for summary 
judgment and R&JL's joinder, and dismissing the HOA's implied warranty claim. (R. 
4092-4097.) The district court expressly held that, although the Declaration may be 
8 
binding between the homeowners and the HOA, nothing in the Declaration "speaks to 
whether the HOA has the right to sue third parties for damages to the ~Living Units' on 
behalf of the homcmivncrs." (R. 4095.) Accordingly, in the absence of explicit contractual 
authority~ the district court held that the HOA lacks privity to assert an implied warranty 
claim. (R. 4095.) 
The district court further held that the HOA did not establish a prima facie case for 
implied warranty. (R. 4095-4097.) Specifically, the district court held that the HOA failed 
to meet the first element of an implied warranty claim because it neither established that 
it purchased a new residence from the Developers or Builders nor that it received 
assignments from the original homeowners to bring claims against the Developers or 
Builders. (R. 4095-4096.) The district court held that absent proof of original ownership 
of each unit allegedly affected by latent defects, the first element of the HOA's implied 
warranty claim was not met. (R. 4095-4096.) Moreover, the district court held that the 
HOA did not have evidence that the alleged defects create a question of safety or made 
the units unfit for human habitation. (R. 4096-4097.) In reaching this conclusion, the 
district court reviewed the HOA' s nearly 1,000 page long expert report and could "find 
only two references to safety: the potential for water intrusion and trapping inside the 
walls and on exterior surfaces, and the settling of parts of the concrete which could 
potentially lead to a tripping hazard and result in an improper stair riser height." (R. 
4096.) The district court concluded that these two statements were insufficient "evidence 
to support its contention that the residences were unsafe or unfit for habitation" and 
expert testimony was necessary "to show that the defects resulted in residences being 
9 
unsafe or unfit for human habitation." (R. 4096.) Finally, the district court held that the 
HOA's rebuttal expert's declaration did not cure these deficiencies because his 
"testimony ... is limited to rebuttal of Defendant's case-in-reply, and cannot be used to 
establish elements of Plaintiffs case~in-chief." (R. 4097 citing Astill v. Clark. 956 P.2d 
1081, I 086 (Utah Ct. App. 1998 ).) 
F. The HOA Files a Motion for Reconsideration. 
On April 10, 2014, the HOA filed a motion to reconsider the March 4 Ruling. (R. 
4185-4187.) In support, the HOA made the following arguments: (1) the district court 
failed to consider the expert reports and testimony that showed the defects made the 
residences unsafe or unfit for human habitation; (2) privity of contract exists between the 
HOA and Developers through the Declaration; and (3) privity of contract exists between 
the HOA and Developers through the original homeowners REPCs and warranty deeds 
with Developers. (R. 4221-4232.) On May 23, 2014, R&JL filed its opposition to the 
HOA's motion to reconsider. (R. 5601-5609.) 
On June 24, 2014, the district court entered a Minute Entry and Order (the "June 
24 Order") denying the HOA's motion to reconsider as follows (R. 5782-5785): 
• The HOA' s motion for reconsideration "is largely comprised of a recitation 
of the identical facts, exhibits and legal analysis which the Court considered 
in its March 4th Ruling." (R. 5784.) 
• The fact that the HOA disagrees with the district court's legal conclusions 
and analysis "is an insufficient basis for the Court to reconsider its Ruling." 
(R. 5784.) 
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The HOA "sought to supplement its Opposition [to Critchfield's motion for 
summary judgment], well after briefing in this matter was complete and 
afler ... the Molion was sel for hearing." (R. 5784.) 
To allow additional briefing, and allow the HOA to raise new arguments 
related to privity from REPCs and warranty deeds, "would have delayed 
I 
resolution of the majority of the dispositive motions" and "it would be 
inequitable to allow [the HOA] a 'second bite at the apple' to defeat 
summary judgment based solely on its failure to include a legal argument in 
support of its Opposition where the underlying facts and law were known at 
the time of filing the initial Opposition." (R. 5784.) 
e And even if the district court did consider HOA' s supplemental arguments, 
it "would not change the Court's Ruling" because the HOA is not an 
intended third-party beneficiary under the REPCs or warranty deeds. (R. 
5784-5785.) 
G. The HOA Takes Its Remaining Claim against Developers and 
Builders to Trial and Loses on a Directed Verdict. 
After the March 4 Ruling and a subsequent clarifying ruling entered on March 26, 
2014 ("March 26 Ruling"), R&JL was dismissed from the case. (R. 4169-4171.) But the 
HOA still had a pending claim against Developers and Builders for breach of fiduciary 
duties, so they proceeded to trial. Between October 13, 2015 and October 20, 2015, the 
district court held a trial and the HOA presented its case to a jury. (R. 10104-10105.) 
After the HOA rested its case, Developers and Builders moved for a directed verdict. (R. 
11 
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10105.) On October 20, 2015, the district court issued a ruling and order granting the 
motion for directed verdict. (R. 9467, 10105.) The district court entered its Final 
Judgment on January 22, 2016. (R. 10104-10105.) 
The HOA filed its notice of appeal on February 11, 2016. (R. 10111-10113.) 
Developers and Builders filed their notice of cross-appeal on February 24, 2016. (R. 
10125-10127.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
As the district court properly held, the HOA (1) lacks privity of contract with 
Developers and Builders; and (2) cannot satisfy the elements of an implied warranty 
claim. In its opening brief, the HOA argues that it has privity of contract through the 
Declaration and as an intended third-party beneficiary of the REPCs and warranty deeds 
executed by and between the original homeowners and the Developers. (HOA Br. at 28-
34.) The HOA also argues that its expert report is sufficient to show safety and 
habitability concerns. (HOA Br. at 22-28.) The HOA's arguments fail for at least 5 
reasons. 
First, as the district court correctly held, the Declaration does not grant the HOA 
any rights to sue on its own behalf or on behalf of the homeowners. The Declaration is a 
contract between the HOA and the landowners, and that contractual relationship does not 
extend to the Developers and Builders. 
Second, the HOA failed to preserve its third-party beneficiary arguments. In its 
opposition to Critchfield's motion for summary judgment, the HOA did not raise any 
third-party beneficiary arguments related to the REPCs or warranty deeds. (R. 2176-
12 
2193.) Over two months after the HOA filed its opposition, the HOA filed a motion for 
leave to file a supplemental opposition to include third-party beneficiary arguments. (R. 
3948-3970.) The district court exercised its discretion and denied the HOA's motion for 
leave to file a supplemental opposition. (R. 5784.) As a result, these arguments were not 
preserved for appeal. 
Third, even if the HOA had preserved its third-party beneficiary arguments, they 
still fail as a matter of law. The HOA does not qualify as a third-party beneficiary under 
either the REPCs or the warranty deeds because the homeowners and Developers did not 
intend to bestow a beneficial interest to the HOA under the REPCs or warranty deeds. 
Fourth, the HOA cannot establish a prima facie case for an implied warranty 
claim. In fact, the HOA fails to appeal or challenge the district court's dismissal of the 
implied warranty claim based on the district court's holding that "the HOA has not 
demonstrated that the units containing the alleged latent defects are owned by the original 
homeowners, such that the implied warranty attaches," as required under Davencourt. (R. 
4095; see generally HOA Br.) The HOA's silence is an implicit admission that it cannot 
satisfy this element. Thus, on this basis alone, the Court should deny the HOA' s appeal. 
Fifth, the HOA cannot maintain a claim for implied warranty because, as the 
district court properly held, the HOA's expert report does not establish that the alleged 
defects create a question of safety or made any of the houses unfit for human habitation. 
The district court's March 4 Ruling and March 26 Ruling should be affirmed and 
the HOA' s implied warranty claim should be dismissed. 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE HOA 
LACKS CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY TO SUE THE DEVELOPERS 
OR BUILDERS. 
The district court correctly held that the HOA lacks standing to sue the Developers 
and Builders under an implied warranty claim. Based on the undisputed facts, and even 
with all reasonable inferences favoring the HOA, the HOA's implied warranty claim fails 
as a matter of law. 
In Davencourt, this Court first recognized an implied warranty of habitability and 
an implied warranty of good quality and workmanship in Utah, which ~-arises under 
contract 1mv. ,. 2009 UT 65 at i,~ 56-60. In Utah, "[p ]rivity of contract is required to bring 
a claim for breach of the implied warranty." ld. at 1 57; see also id. at ,r 63 ("[T]he 
Association may bring its claim for breach of the implied warranty, but it must show 
privity of contract with the Developer."). 
A. The HOA Does Not Have Privity under the Declaration. 
As the district court held, the HOA lacks privity under the Declaration to bring a 
claim for implied warranty against the Developers or Builders. (R. 4095.) In Utah, the 
original homeowner of a new residence--not a homeowners association-has the right to 
bring a claim for implied warranty under its purchase contract. Davencourt, 2008 UT 65 
at ~ 55 ("[I]n every contract for the sale of a new residence, a vendor in the business of 
building or selling such residences makes an implied warranty to the vendee that the 
residence is constructed in a workmanlike manner and fit for habitation."). The 
requirement for privity in an implied warranty claim comports with Ptah Code Ann. ~ 
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H---~ -::=: · \ which states that "[ a ]n action for defective design or construction may be 
brought only by a person in privity of contract" f);!vcncuuri . .-2nn:-< l T 1\.:; :1 1 : quoting 
i< U -:l---5 l further states, 'Nothing in this 
section precludes a person from assigning a right under a contract to another person, 
including to a subsequent owner or a homeowners association."' D:.l'. e::·-.:!'.1 LLrt, ,20\):? l. T 
(;~ i.li. n.lJ quoting L:uh Code 1-\nn. :~ 7 8B-4-5U(6}. Thus, under Utah law, an original 
homeowner can bring an implied warranty claim if certain elements are satisfied. And; as 
Davencourt explains, an original homeowner can assign that right to a subsequent 
homeowner or to a homeowners association. Id. 
Here, the HOA does not argue that the original homeowners assigned the right to 
bring an implied warranty claim to the HOA. Instead, the HOA argues that it has an 
independent right through the Declaration to sue the Developers. (HOA Br. at 29-30.) 
Specifically, the HOA argues that the Declaration grants the HOA "the right (and 
obligation) to maintain certain common property and accept all owners as members, and 
in exchange, the property owner commits future owners to pay assessments to the 
Association and to abide by certain standards," and that this gives the HOA contractual 
privity with the Developers to bring an implied warranty claim. (HOA Br. at 30 citing R. 
2194-2222.) 
Noticeably absent from the HOA's argument is any legal authority to support its 
position that the Declaration is a contract between the HOA and the Developers. It is not. 
A h d. . 1 h ld h D I . . " b. d. t t h h s t. e 1stnct court proper y __ e_ ., Le __ ec aratlon 1s a m .mg con_rac __ etween Le 
homeowners and the HOA." (R. 4095.) The HOA only cited a single provision of the 
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Declaration to support its argument: "The Association shall provide exterior maintenance 
of the Living Units including but not limited to painting, repair, replacement and care of 
roofs, gutters, downspouts, and exterior building surfaces." (R. 4095.) Based upon a plain 
reading, the district court held nothing in the Declaration "provides the HOA with 
authorization from the homeowners to pursue claims for breach of implied warranty on 
their behalf." (R. 4095.) And even if the Declaration was an agreement between the HOA 
and Developers, nothing in the Declaration gives the HOA "independent authority to 
bring [implied warranty] claims on its own behalf." (R. 4095.) 
As this Court has previously held, the implied warranty is inherent "in every 
contract for the sale of a new residence .... " 2008 UT 65 at ,r 55. Nowhere in the 
Davencourt decision did this Court state that declarations, covenants, or restrictions that 
are recorded against real property grant a homeowner's association the right to bring an 
implied warranty claim. Despite this, the HOA argues that "the existence of privity 
between declarants and associations is well-grounded in established Utah law." (HOA Br. 
at 28 citing Forest Meadow Ranch Propertv Owners Ass·n. L.L.C. v. Pine Meadow 
Ranch Home Ass'n, 2005 UT App 294. 118 P.3d 871.) The HOA's reliance on Forest 
Meado\v is misplaced. 
Forest Meadow is inapplicable to this case because it addresses privity of estate 
not privity of contract. The HOA is attempting to conflate the legal concepts of 
establishing privity of estate necessary to demonstrate that a restrictive covenant runs 
with the land and privity of contract necessary to bring an implied warranty claim under 
Davencourt. Tellingly, the elements for a claim that a covenant runs with the land are 
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entirely different than those for a claim for breach of the implied warranty. Compare 
Privity 
of contract is defined as: "The relationship behveen the parties to a contract, allowing 
them to sue each other but preventing a third party from doing so." Black's Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In other words, privity applies only to the actual contracting 
parties. As the HOA concedes, 3 Davencourt specifically limited claims for breach of the 
implied warra.nty to parties in direct privity of contract in order to avoid creating 
unintended third-party causes of action for non-contractual parties. D8vencnurt, 2009 { _;T 
(}5 at il 2 3. That is exactly what the HOA-which unquestionably was not a party to the 
contracts between the Developers and original homeowners-is seeking to do here. 
However, this is not the law in Utah. Rather, as set forth in 0~1 vcncourt, to establish a 
claim for breach of the implied warranty contractual privity must exist between the 
purchaser and the seller. Here, that privity exists only between the Developers and the 
original homeowners via their individual real estate purchase contracts and the HOA is a 
stranger to those contracts. Accordingly, Forest Meadow does not and could not support 
the HOA's position on appeal. 
Further, Forest Meadow has no precedential value and should not be relied on by 
the Court. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Forest M (:ridrni..- decision, but only after the 
Court struck the petitioners' briefs for including "attacks on the integrity of the court of 
appeals panel that decided the cases below." Peters v. Pinc Meadow· Ranch Home Ass·n. 
2tJ07 Lil L if 2J, 15 t P.3<l ~)C,2. After striking the briefs, the Court ""declin[ed] to consider 
3 (HOA Br. at 30.) 
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the issues as to which [it] granted certiorari" and "limit[ed] the court of appeals' 
decisions to the facts of each case, and deem[ ed] the decisions to be without precedential 
effect." Id. ( emphasis added). Without a decision on the merits or precedential effect, the 
Forest Meadow provides little value and is inapplicable to this case. 
Moreover, even if the HOA could establish privity of contract with Developers, 
the HOA has admitted that it does not have privity of contract with Builders. (R. 2179 at 
,r 9; R. 2181 at ,r 15.) R&JL only has contract with Builders, not Developers. (R. 1682-
1702.) Thus, any claim asserted by the HOA against the Developers could not pass 
through to R&JL. Accordingly, regardless of the finding regarding privity between the 
HOA and the Developers, this Court should make clear that it does not affect the 
dismissal of R&JL from this case. 
B. The HOA Failed to Preserve Its Privity Argument Related to the 
REPCs or Warranty Deeds. 
In its original opposition, the HOA did not argue (as it tries to do here) that it has 
"contractual privity with the Developers because it is a third-party beneficiary to the 
REPCs and warranty deeds between the Developers and the individual Unit Owners." 
(HOA Br. at 30.) "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to 
the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc .. 2004 UT 72. 4i 5 L 99 P.3<l 80 l (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted). 
Here, the HOA did not attempt to raise this argument until filing a motion for 
leave to supplement its opposition over two months after filing its original opposition. (R. 
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3948-3955.) Critchfield objected to the HOA 's motion for leave and the district court 
eventually denied the HOA's motion for leave because it would have "delayed resolution 
of the majority of dispositive motions'· and "it would be inequitable to allow [the HOA] a 
·second bite at the apple' to defeat summary judgment based solely on its failure to 
include a legal argument in support of its Opposition where the underlying facts and law 
were known at the time of filing the initial Opposition." (R. 3977-3983, 5784.) 
Because the trial court denied the HOA's motion for leave, the HOA's third party 
beneficiary arguments regarding the REPCs and warranty deeds were not part of the trial 
court's summary judgment decision. Thus, the HOA neither presented its REPC and 
warranty deed arguments in a way that the trial court had an opportunity to rule on them 
nor allowed other parties to oppose these arguments before the district court. 
Accordingly, the HOA failed to preserve these arguments for appeal and this Court 
should not consider them here. 
Moreover, although it is not raised in the HOA's statement of the issues or its 
brief, to the extent the HOA is seeking to challenge the district court's ruling denying the 
HOA' s motion for leave to supplement, that decision is within the broad discretion of the 
trial court, and this Court "will not disturb such a ruling absent a showing of an abuse of 
that discretion." Sm;tL \:. (irnnd C:rn1,c:-ri Exncditions Co.: 2003 !_,'T 57) ~[ 31. ½4 P.Jd 
l ! 54. And since the HOA has not even raised the issue on appeal, much less alleged that 
the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for leave to supplement, the 
district comt's denial should be upheld and the HO.A's argument deemed 1u1preserved. 
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C. The HOA's REPC and Warranty Deed Privity Arguments Fail 
on Their Merits. 
Even if the HOA had properly preserved its third-party beneficiary privity 
arguments, these arguments still fail as a matter of law. "Whether a third-party 
beneficiary status exists is determined by examining a written contract." Am. Tov,;ers 
Ovmers Ass~n. Inc. v. CCI Mechanical. Inc. 1 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996). "To 
establish enforceable rights ... the Association had to establish that it was an intended 
beneficiary of one or more contracts." Id. "The intent of the contracting parties to confer 
a separate and distinct benefit must be clear." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "A 
third party who benefits only incidentally from the performance of a contract has no right 
to recover under that contract." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the HOA argues that "[ e ]ach original owner within the Gables ... has direct 
privity with the Developer through a REPC." (HOA Br. at 31.) R&JL does not dispute 
this. But the HOA also argues that it is a third-party beneficiary to the REPCs because 
"each purchase contract not only transfers individual rights to the Units, but the contract 
also binds each purchaser to the requirements and restrictions found in the Association's 
Declaration." (HOA Br. at 31.) The HOA then argues that the "warranty deeds issued·by 
the developer . . . also conveyed an easement to use and enjoy the common areas and 
facilities," and therefore, the deeds "underscore the benefit created in the Association as a 
result of the sale of the property." (HOA Br. at 32.) 
Nothing in the REPCs or the warranty deeds, however, demonstrates that the 
homeowners and Developers intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit on the 
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HOA. The HOA cites no case law to support its argument that it has privity of contract 
under the REPCs or warranty deeds to sue the Developers under an implied warranty 
claim. Thus, as the distiict court prnpeily held on the IIOA' s motion for reconsideration, 
''the fact that Plaintiff may incidentally benefit from the contracts is insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to confer third-party beneficiary status." (R. 5784.) 
n. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE HOA 
DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR AN IMPLIED 
WARRANTY CLAIM. 
Even if the HOA had privity to bring its implied warranty claim-which it does 
not-the HOA's claim still fails as a matter of law. Under Utah law, to establish a breach 
of the implied warranty claim the plaintiff must show "(1) the purchase of a new 
residence from a defendant ... (2) the residence contained a latent defect; (3) the defect 
manifested itself after purchase; (4) the defect was caused by improper design, material, 
or workmanship; and (5) the defect created a question of safety or made the house unfit 
for human habitation." DavencourL 2009 LT 65 at "l 60. 
A. The District Court Correctly Held that the HOA has not 
Satisfied the First Element for an Implied Warranty Claim. 
In its March 4 Ruling, the district court held that "the HOA has not demonstrated 
that the units containing the alleged latent defects are owned by the original homeowners, 
such that the implied warranty attaches." (R. 4095.) The district court therefore held that 
the HOA had failed to meet the first element of its breach of implied warranty claim. 
The HOA fails to challenge this holding in its opening brief. (See generally HOA 
Br.) As a result, the HOA has not appealed this issue and the Court is unable to review 
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this issue on appeal. See Berkshires. L.L.C. v. Svk~s, 2(HJ5 LT App 536, ~: 20. 127 P.3d 
1 l 22 ("We decline to review the issue of plain error when raised for the first time in an 
appellant's reply brief."). Thus, as a matter of law, the HOA cannot establish a prima 
facie case for an implied warranty claim and the Court should affirm the district court's 
dismissal. 
Further, having failed to raise the argument on appeal, the HOA has now waived 
its right to do so. "Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Meadow 
Vallev Contr.. Inc. v. State Dep't ofTransp., 20t 1 UT 35, ~ 45,266 P.3d 671 (quotation 
and citation omitted). A waiver requires three elements: "(l) an existing right, benefit, or 
advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish that right." 
Soter·s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass·n. 857 P.2d 935. 940 (Utah 1993). 
Here, the HOA intentionally relinquished its right to appeal this holding from the 
district court. There is no dispute that the HOA had the right to appeal this portion of the 
district court's March 4 Ruling and that the HOA had knowledge of this right. Based on a 
plain reading of its opening brief, the HOA intentionally relinquished this right by failing 
to raise any challenge or argument to refute the district court's holding. Accordingly, the 
HOA has waived its right to appeal this finding from the district court and the Supreme 
Court can affirm the district court's March 4 Ruling and dismissal on this basis alone. 
B. The District Court Correctly Held that the HOA has not 
Satisfied the Fifth Element of an Implied Warranty Claim. 
Finally, the district court properly held that the HOA "has not met its burden of 
proof on the fifth element, since it has not demonstrated that the latent defects created a 
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question of safety or made the house unfit for human habitation." (R. 4096.) In order to 
establish an implied warranty claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged defects 
create a question of safety or make the house unfit for human habitation. Ua\ cr,cnuri. 
2no9 Ur :'55 :.r'. :i; 60. "Utah courts have held that expert testimony may be helpful, and in 
some cases necessary, in establishing the standard of care required in cases dealing with 
the duties owed by a particular profession." Prcstc1 11 & Clian1b1..Ts. P.C. \i. Koller, 943 
1 [ (). "Expert testimony is required where the average person has little understanding of 
the duties owed by particular trades or professions, as in cases involving medical doctors, 
architects, and engineers." Koller. 94] P.::2d at 26.; (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Here, as properly explained by the district court, expert testimony is necessary to 
determine whether the alleged defects create safety issues in the house or make the house 
uninhabitable. (R. 4096.) The HOA's expert report contains no findings or conclusions 
sufficient to establish defects affecting safety or habitability of the units. In reviewing the 
HOA's expert report, which is nearly 1,000 pages long, the district court found "only two 
references to safety: the potential for water intrusion and trapping inside the walls and on 
exterior surfaces, and the settling of parts of the concrete which could potentially lead to 
a tripping hazard and result in an improper stair riser height." (R. 4096.) The district court 
properly held that these two lone statements were insufficient "evidence to support its 
contention that the residences were unsafe or unfit for habitation" and expert testimony 
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was necessary "to show that the defects resulted in residences being unsafe or unfit for 
human habitation." (R. 4096.) 
Recognizing this failure, the HOA instead tries to argue that the expert report 
details "defects and damages caused by significant water intrusion which requires 
substantial repair." (HOA Br. at 27.) The HOA also asserts (without citation) that later 
trial testimony demonstrates the sufficiency of the defect evidence, but that evidence was 
not presented by the HOA on summary judgment and cannot bear on the issues on appeal 
of the district court's summary judgment decision. (HOA Br. at 23.) The HOA further 
argues that in other jurisdictions the implied warranty is broadly construed and water 
intrusion is sufficient to establish an implied warranty claim. (HOA Br. at 24-27.) That 
may be generally true in certain jurisdictions. However, nothing in the HOA's brief or 
the cases cited therein changes the analysis here. Namely, that in Utah the HOA has an 
obligation to provide expert evidence that the defects at issue are a safety concern or 
could make the house unfit for human habitation. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65 at ,r 60. The 
district court properly held that HOA' s failure to do so results in the dismissal of its 
implied warranty claim. This Court should affirm that decision. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth herein, R&JL respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismiss the HOA's breach of 
the implied warranty claim. 
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DATED this 13th day of February, 2017. 
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